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This paper deals with two-sided matching market with two disjoint sets, i.e. the set of buyers and the set of sellers.
Each seller can trade with at most with one buyer and vice versa. Money is transferred from sellers to buyers for
an indivisible goods that buyers own. Valuation functions, for participants of both sides, are represented by strictly
increasing functions with money considered as discrete variable. An algorithm is devised to prove the existence of
stability for this model.
Keywords: Stable matching, marriage model, indivisible goods, increasing valuations
1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, numerous scholars have carried out research pertaining to two-sided matching
problem. In a two sided matching problem, the set of participants are divided into two disjoint sets, say
U and V . Each participant ranks a participant of other set in order of preferences. Main objective of two-
sided matching problem is formation of partnership between the participants of U and V . A matching
X , is one-to-one correspondence between the participant of one set to the participant of other set. Main
requirement in a two-sided matching problems is that of stability of matchings. A matching is stable if all
participants have acceptable partners and there does not exist a pair that is not matched but prefers each
other to their current partners.
The concept of finding two-sided stable matching was first given by Gale and Shapley [5] in their
paper “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”. In the course of presenting an algorithm
for matching applicants to college places, they introduced and solved the stable marriage problem. This
problem deals with two disjoint sets of participants U and V . Each participant of these sets submits a
preference list ranking a subset of other set of participants in order of preference. The aim is to form a
one-to-one matching X of the participants such that no two participants would prefer each other to their
partner in X . The authors used their solution to this problem as a basis for solving the extended problem
where one of the sets consists of college applicants, and the other consists of colleges, each of which has
a quota of places to fill. An important feature of their model is that no negotiations are allowed among the
participant of both sets. This shows that participants in their model are rigid. Many additional variants
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of the stable marriage problem have been discussed in the literature. Gusfield and Irving [6] published a
book that covers many variants of original stable marriage problem such as the preferences of agents may
include ties, incomplete preferences, weighted edges as well as non-bipartite versions such as roommate
problem.
Shapley and Shubik [8] presented the one-to-one buyer seller model known as “assignment game”. In
their model, participants are flexible because monetary transfer is permitted among participants of both
sets. Each participant on one side can supply exactly one unit of some indivisible good and exchange it
for money with a participant from the other side whose demand is also one unit. Shapley and Shubik [8]
showed that the core of the game is a non-empty complete lattice, where the core is defined as the set of
un-denominated outcomes. The core in their model is a solution set based upon a linear programming
formulation of the model [8].
After this, two-sided matchings have been studied extensively. Different approaches have been made
by many researchers in which they generalize the marriage model of Gale and Shapley [5] and assignment
game of Shapley and Shubik [8]. Main aim of these researchers was to find common result for both of
[5] and [8] models in a more general way. Eriksson and Karlander [2] and Sotomayor [9] presented the
hybrid models. These models are the generalization of the discrete marriage model [5] and continuous
assignment game [8]. Existence of stable outcome and the core is discussed in [2, 9]. Farooq [3] presented
a one-to-one matching model in which he identified the preferences of participants by strictly increasing
linear functions. He proposed an algorithm to show the existence of pairwise stable outcome in his model
by taking money as a continuous variable. His model includes the marriage model of Gale and Shapely
[5], assignment game of Shapely and Shubik [8] and Erikson and Karlander [2] hybrid model as special
cases. The motivation of our work from the stable matching literature is the model of Ali and Farooq [1].
Ali and Farooq [1] presented a one-to-onematching model by taking money as a discrete variable in linear
increasing function. They designed an algorithm to show that pairwise stable outcome always exists. The
complexity of Ali and Farooq’s [1] algorithm depends on the size of those intervals where prices fall. Our
model is the generalized form of Ali and Farooq [1] model. We consider the preferences of participants
by general increasing function and designed an algorithm to find a pairwise stable outcome in our model.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes of our model briefly. Section 3 gives the
Sequential Mechanisms for buyer and seller. Section 4 describes the supple and demand characterization
of stable matching. We devise an algorithm which finds a stable outcome in our model in Section 5. In
Section 6, we discuss the main result of our model.
2 The Model Description
The matching market under consideration consists of two types of participants one type of participants
are sellers and second type of participants are buyers. Here U and V denote the sets of sellers and buyers,
respectively. Throughout in this paper, we model matching markets as trading platforms where buyers
and sellers interact. Moreover, each buyer as well as seller can trade with at most one participant on the
other side of the market at a particular time. The negotiation and side payments between participants of
both sides are allowed. Naturally, each participant wants to gain as much profit as possible from his/her
partner. Let E = U × V denotes the set of all possible pairs of seller-buyer. Also when buyer and seller
interact with each other in auction market they have some upper and lower bounds of prices. We express
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these bounds by vector pi, pi ∈ ZE where always piij ≤ piij for each (i, j) ∈ E
(i). The price vector is
denoted by p and define as p = (pij ∈ Z|(i, j) ∈ E). The price vector is said to be feasible price vector
if it satisfies pi ≤ p ≤ pi (ii).
Since each participant has preferences over the participants of the other set, so the preferences of sellers
over buyers and buyers over sellers is given by the valuation function fij(x) and fji(−x) for each (i, j) ∈
E. Here fij(x) denotes the valuation of seller i ∈ U , when he or she trade with buyer j ∈ V , and get an
amount of money x from buyer j ∈ V . Similarly, fji(−x) represents the valuation of buyer j ∈ V , when
he or she trade with seller i ∈ U , and pays an amount of money x. These valuation functions are strictly
increasing functions of money (iii).
3 The Buyer Seller Sequential Mechanism
Since fij(x) and fji(−x) denote the preferences of participants so if fij(x) ≥ 0, then we say that seller
i is ready to make a partnership with buyer j if j pays i an amount x of money. Or we can say that
buyer j is acceptable to seller i an amount x of money. Also if fji(−x) ≥ 0, then we say that buyer j is
ready to make a partnership with seller i an amount x of money. If fi0j0(x1) > fi0j1(x1), then we can
say that seller i0 prefers buyer j0 to buyer j1 at money x1 where i0 ∈ U and j0, j1 ∈ V and x1 ∈ Z.
If fj0i0(−x1) > fj0i1(−x1), then we can say that j0 prefers i0 to i1 at money x1 where i0, i1 ∈ U
and j0 ∈ V and x1 ∈ Z. If fi0j0(x1) = fi0j1(x1), then seller i0 is indifferent between j0 and j1 at
money x1. Also, if fj0i0(−x1) = fj0i1(−x1), then buyer j0 is said to be indifferent between i0 and
i1 at money x1. If fij(x) = 0, then seller i is indifferent between the buyer j and himself at x. If
an individual is not indifferent between any two participants then the preferences of such individual are
called strict preferences. In our model, preferences of the participants are not strict because these are
based on monetary transfer and therefore, different functions may have same value for two distinct values
of money. If fji(−x) = 0 for some x ∈ Z, then buyer j is indifferent between the seller i and himself at
x. Preferences of participants are not strict in our model because the monetary transfer is allowed between
participants of both sets.
4 The Supply and Demand Characterization of Stable Matchings
This section describes the characteristic of an outcome for which it would be stable. A subset X , of a
set E, is called matching if every agent appear at most once in X . A matching X is said to be pairwise
stable if it is individually rational and is not blocked by any buyer-seller pair. A 4-tuple (X ; p, q, r) of
a matching X and a feasible price vector p is said to be a pairwise-stable outcome if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
(p1) q ≥ 0 and r ≥ 0,
(p2) fij(c) ≤ qi or fji(−c) ≤ rj for all c ∈ [piij , piij ]Z and for all (i, j) ∈ E
(iv),
(i) The notation Z stand for set of integers and notation R stand for set of real numbers. The notation ZE stands for integer lattice
whose points are indexed by E.
(ii) For any two vectors x ∈ ZE and y ∈ ZE , we say that x ≤ y if xij ≤ yij for all (i, j) ∈ E.
(iii) By strictly increasing function we mean that for x > y implies f(x) > f(y).
(iv) we define [x, y]Z = {a ∈ Z | x ≤ a ≤ y}.
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where (q, r) ∈ RU × RV is defined by
qi =
{
fij(pij) if (i, j) ∈ X for some j ∈ V
0 otherwise
(i ∈ U), (1)
rj =
{
fji(−pij) if (i, j) ∈ X for some i ∈ U
0 otherwise
(j ∈ V ). (2)
Condition (p1) says that the matching X is individually rational. Condition (p2) means (X ; p, q, r)
is not blocked by any buyer-seller pair. A matching X is said to be pairwise-stable if (X ; p, q, r) is
pairwise-stable.
To show the existence of pairwise-stable outcome in the model defined in Section 3, we first need to
calculate price vector p for each buyer-seller pairs. Since prices should be feasible and pij ∈ Z for each
(i, j) ∈ E(v), so initially we define it by
pij =
{
piij if fji(−piij) ≥ 0
max
{
piij ,
⌊
−f−1ji (0)
⌋
otherwise.
(3)
Before describing the algorithm mathematically, we define few subsets of set E that help us to find a
matchingX satisfying condition (p1). Firstly, we define the subsetK0 and T0 of set E, that contain those
buyer-seller pairs from the set E that are not mutually acceptable, as:
K0 = {(i, j) ∈ E | fji(−pij) < 0}, (4)
T0 = {(i, j) ∈ E | fij(pij) < 0}. (5)
K0 is the set of all those pairs where buyer is not ready to trade with seller and T0 is the set of all those
pairs where seller is not ready to trade with buyer. Now the set of mutually acceptable buyer-seller pairs
is defined as:
E˜ = E \ {K0 ∪ T0}. (6)
Define q˜i for each i ∈ U , and E˜P by (7) and (8)
q˜i = max{fij(pij) | (i, j) ∈ E˜} (7)
and
E˜P = {(i, j) ∈ E˜ | fij(pij) = q˜i}. (8)
The maximum over an empty set is taken to be zero by definition. Here the set E˜P contains those buyer-
seller pairs which are mutually acceptable and the buyer is most preferred for seller out of all acceptable
buyers. We define a subset ÊP of E˜P by:
ÊP = {(i, j) ∈ E˜P | fji(−pij) ≥ rj}. (9)
Initially, since r = 0, ÊP will coincide with E˜P . However, in the further iterations of the algorithm ÊP
may be a proper subset of E˜P .
(v) ⌊x⌋ = sup{n ∈ Z | x ≥ n}.
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Since we have no matchingX at the start of the algorithm, so consider V˜ = ∅, where V˜ denotes the set
of matched buyers in X , that is,
V˜ = {j ∈ V | j is matched inX}. (10)
If V˜ = ∅, then there is no matched buyer in matching X . At each step in the algorithm, the matching X
in the bipartite graph (U, V ; ÊP ) must satisfies the following conditions:
(s1) X matches all members of V˜ ,
(s2) X maximizes
∑
(i,j)∈X
fji(−pij) among the matchings that satisfy (s1).
Up to this point the outcome (X ; p, q, r) obviously satisfies the condition (p1). To satisfy the condition
(p2), we define the setK of all those buyer-seller pairs that are mutually acceptable and the buyer is most
preferred to seller but the seller is unmatched inX by
K = {(i, j) ∈ E˜P | i is unmatched inX}. (11)
Lemma 4.1. IfK = ∅, then matchingX is stable.
Proof: We know that a stable matching satisfy conditions (p1) and (p2). By definition X ⊆ E˜ thus (p1)
holds true. Suppose thatK = ∅ and on contrary suppose that (p2) dose not hold true. This means that for
some (i, j) ∈ E there exists c ∈ [piij , piij ] such that fji(−c) > rj and fij(c) > qi. Initially, r = 0 and
fji(−pij) ≥ 0 for (i, j) ∈ E, therefore, pij ≥ c, by (3). This means that fij(pij) ≥ fij(c) > qi. But
K = ∅ implies that fij(pij) < q˜i = qi, which is a contradiction. This proves the assertion.
IfK = ∅ then there is no need to modify price vector p and define further sets but ifK is not empty then
we will modify price vector, by preserving condition (p1). The new price vector must also be feasible, that
is, piij ≤ p˜ij ≤ piij for each (i, j) ∈ E. Since we are considering strictly increasing functions, therefore,
we can find a real numberm∗ij ∈ R
++ for each (i, j) ∈ K , to modify price vector p, such that
fji(−(pij −m
∗
ij)) = rj . (12)
Since we are dealing with discrete prices so we will define an integermij as follows:
mij = max
{
1, ⌈m∗ij⌉
}
. (13)
Now, we have
fji(−(pij −mij)) ≥ rj , (14)
where pij −mij is an integer andmij is the minimum positive integer that satisfies the above condition.
This means that
fji(−(pij − (mij − 1))) ≤ rj .
Here the integer mij for each (i, j) ∈ K helps us in finding the new price vector such that condition
(p2) also satisfies. Now we define a subset L of K that contain those pairs from the set K for which
modified price does not remain feasible.
L = {(i, j) ∈ K | pij −mij < piij}. (15)
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The modified price vector p˜ must also be feasible and is defined by:
p˜ij :=
{
max{piij , pij −mij} if (i, j) ∈ K
pij otherwise
(i, j) ∈ E. (16)
We also define a subset T˜0 ofK by:
T˜0 := {(i, j) ∈ K | fij(p˜ij) < 0}. (17)
Remark: Throughout in the algorithm, our modified price vector will be decreasing and the size of
matching X will be increasing. Also, the participants will change their preferences according to new
price vector.
5 An Algorithm for Finding a Pairwise Stability
In this section, we propose an algorithm for finding a pairwise stable outcome for the model described in
Section 3.
Input: Two disjoint and finite sets U and V , the set of ordered pairs E = U × V , price vector p ∈ ZE ,
two vectors pi ∈ ZE and pi ∈ ZE where pi ≤ pi, general increasing functions .
Output: Vectors (q, r) ∈ RU × RV , and p ∈ ZE must satisfy (p1) and (p2).
Step 0: Put V˜ = ∅ and r = 0. Initially define p, K0, T0, E˜, q˜, E˜P and ÊP by (3)−(9), respectively and
find a matchingX in the bipartite graph (U, V ; ÊP ) satisfying (s1) and (s2). Define r, V˜ andK by
(2, (10) and (11), respectively.
Step 1: IfK = ∅ then define q by (1) and stop. Otherwise go to Step 2.
Step 2: For each (i, j) ∈ K calculate mij by (13) and new price vector p˜ by (16). Define L and T˜0 by
(15) and (17), respectively and update T0 by T0 := T0 ∪ T˜0 andK0 byK0 := K0 ∪ L.
Step 3: Replace price vector p by p˜ and modify E˜ by:
E˜ := E˜ \ {K0 ∪ T0}. (18)
Again define q˜ by (7) and modify E˜P , ÊP by (8) and (9) respectively, for the updated p and E˜. Find
a matching X in the bipartite graph (U, V ; ÊP ) that satisfies the conditions (s1) and (s2). Again
define r, V˜ andK by (2), (10) and (11), respectively. Go to Step 1.
6 Existence of Pairwise Stability
In this section, we will show the existence of pairwise stability for this model. For this purpose, we will
show that the algorithm we have proposed terminates and at termination it outputs a stable matching. We
will also give some other important results about the model and the algorithm.
We will add prefixes (old)∗ and (new)∗ to sets/vectors/integers before and after update, respectively,
in any iteration of the algorithm. The key result is Lemma 6.2 which will be proved here using the
assumption defined in equation (13).
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Lemma 6.1. There exists a matchingX in the bipartite graph (U, V ; ÊP ) that satisfy condition (s1) and
(s2) in each iteration of the algorithm at Step 3.
Proof: The proof of the lemma is equivalent to show that (old)X ⊆ (new)ÊP at Step 3, in each iteration.
In each iteration at Step 2 and at Step 3, we update vector p and E˜ by (16) and (18), respectively. As clear
from (16) and (18), these modifications are done for elements or/and subsets ofK . As K ∩ (old)X = ∅,
therefore, (old)X ⊆ (new)ÊP .
The following lemma represents the significance ofmij for each (i, j) ∈ K and explains that updated
price is the maximum price at which (i, j) ∈ K can match.
Lemma 6.2. In each iteration of the algorithm at Step 3, we have fji(−(pij − mij)) ≥ rj for each
(i, j) ∈ K . Furthermore, if fji(−(pij −mij)) > rj for some (i, j) ∈ K then pij −mij is the maximum
integer for which this inequality holds.
Proof: Let (i, j) ∈ K this means that fji(−(old)pij) ≤ rj . At Step 2 we calculated an integer mij by
(13) for each (i, j) ∈ K with following property
fji(−((old)pij −mij)) ≥ rj .
This proves the first part of the assertion.
Next, we prove the second part of the lemma that if fji(−((old)pij−mij)) > rj then (old)pij−mij is
the maximum integer for which this holds. This can be proven by showing thatmij is minimum positive
integer for which fji(−((old)pij −mij)) > rj holds.
By (13), we havemij ≥ 1. First we consider the case whenm
∗
ij ≤ 1, that is,mij = 1 by (13). For this
case the result holds trivially asmij = 1 is minimum positive integer. Now, consider whenm
∗
ij > 1. We
m∗ij is a real number for which we have
rj = fji(−(old)pij +m
∗
ij)
As we are dealing with strictly increasing function, therefore, for any real number δ > 0, we have
fji(−((old)pij − (m
∗
ij + δ))) > rj > fji(−((old)pij − (m
∗
ij − δ))). (19)
Since
mij = ⌈m
∗
ij⌉ ≥ m
∗
ij . (20)
By (19), m∗ij is minimum positive real number for which rj < fji(−(old)pij +m
∗
ij) and by (20), mij
is minimum positive integer for which fji(−(pij − mij)) > rj . Thus (old)pij −mij is the maximum
integer for which fji(−(pij −mij)) > rj holds.
For (i, j) ∈ K , we update price vector by (16). There is a possibility that (new)pij does not remain
feasible, that is, pij < piij . To maintain the feasibility in such cases we have the following result.
Lemma 6.3. For each (i, j) ∈ L we have (new)pij = piij and fji(−(new)pij) ≤ (old)rj , where L is
defined at Step 2.
The proof of the Lemma 6.3 follows by using (15) and (16).
The following lemma describes the important features of our algorithm. The results of these lemma
will be used to show that the algorithm will terminate after finite number of iterations.
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Lemma 6.4. In each iteration of the algorithm, following hold:
(i) If L 6= ∅ or T˜0 6= ∅ at Step 2 then E˜ reduces at Step 3. Otherwise E˜ will remain the same.
(ii) The vector p decreases or remains same. In particular, if K \ {L ∪ T˜0} 6= ∅ at Step 2 then pij
decreases at Step 3 for all (i, j) ∈ K \ {L ∪ T˜0}.
(iii) The vector r increases or remains same.
Proof:
(i) At Step 0, E˜ is given by (6) and it is updated by (18), at Step 3. At Step 2 we updatedK0 = K0 ∪ L
and T0 = T0 ∪ T˜0. According to (18), E˜ will reduce if L 6= ∅ or T˜0 6= ∅ at Step 2. If both L and T˜0
are empty the E˜ will remain unchanged by (18).
(ii) Initially, p is set by (3) and in each iteration it is updated by (16). It is easy to see that for (i, j) ∈ K ,
p˜ij ≤ pij . Here the equality may hold for (i, j) ∈ L ∪ T˜0.
(iii) At the start of the algorithm we set r = 0. We modified r by (2) afterwards. In each iteration,
matchingX satisfies condition (s1) this means that (old)V˜ ⊆ (new)V˜ . Also, (new)p ≤ (old)p by
part (ii) of Lemma 6.4. Thus (new)rj = fji(−(new)pij) ≥ (old)rj , for j ∈ (old)V˜ , as matching
X also satisfies (s2). Moreover, (old)rj = (new)rj = 0 for each j ∈ V \ V˜ . Therefore, vector r
either remains the same or increases.
To show that our algorithm produces a stable matching is not possible without proving that our algo-
rithm will terminate after some iterations.
Theorem 6.5. The algorithm terminates after finite number of iterations.
Proof: Termination of the algorithm depends upon set of mutually acceptable pairs and price vector p.
By the Lemma 6.4 part (i), E˜ reduces when either L 6= ∅ or T0 6= ∅ or remains the same. This case is
possible at most |E| times.
If L = T0 = ∅ then, by part (ii) of Lemma 6.4, pij decreases for each (i, j) ∈ K . Otherwise, p remains
unchanged. As we know that p is bounded and discrete, therefore, it can be decreased a finite number of
time. This proves that in either case our algorithm terminates after a finite number of iterations.
This is the most important result which establishes the existence of pairwise stability for our model.
Theorem 6.6. The outcome (X ; p, q, r) must satisfies the condition (p1) and (p2) if algorithm terminates.
Proof: We know that X ⊆ E˜. Initially E˜ is defined by (6) and afterwards it is updated by (18) at Step 3
in each iteration. Thus fij(pij) and fji(−pij) are non-negative for all (i, j) ∈ E˜. Therefore, fij(pij) ≥ 0
and fji(−pij) ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ X . This shows that theX satisfies (p1) at termination.
On contrary to (p2), assume that there exist α ∈ [piij , piij ] and (i, j) ∈ E such that
fij(α) > qi and fji(−α) > rj .
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If we take pij < α it yields fji(−pij) > fji(−α) > rj . But according to Lemma 6.2, pij is the maximum
integer for which this inequality holds. Thus pij < α is not possible. Now consider that pij ≥ α, which
implies that
fij(pij) ≥ fij(α) > qi. (21)
However, at termination we haveK = ∅means that (i, j) 6∈ K and since (i, j) are not matched, therefore,
fij(pij) < q˜i = qi. A contradiction to (21). Thus (p2) holds when the algorithm terminates.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a matching model where money is given in integers. The preferences of participants
are represented by general increasing utility functions. Ali and Farooq [1] is a special case of our model.
We have given a constructive proof for the existence of a pairwise stable outcome in our model. As a
future work it is important to consider problems concerning the structures of pairwise stable outcomes in
our model. It is well-known that stable matchings forms a lattice. A similar approach can be found in
article [4] by Farooq et al. It would be worthwhile to prove the existence of stable outcome for many-
to-many model with such valuation functions by using the same mathematical apparatus. Further, the
complexity of our algorithm may depend on the length of [pi, pi]. An interesting problem may be to devise
an algorithm with polynomial complexity in the number of participants.
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